The normativity of content and 'the Frege point'

European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):405-415 (2009)
Abstract
In "Assertion," Geach identified failure to attend to the distinction between meaning and speech act as a source of philosophical errors. I argue that failure to attend to this distinction, along with the parallel distinction between attitude and content, has been behind the idea that meaning and content are, in some sense, normative. By an argument parallel to Geach's argument against performative analyses of "good" we can show that the phenomena identified by theorists of the normativity of content are properties in the first instance of speech act and propositional attitude types, rather than content as such.
Keywords normativity of meaning  normativity of content
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (2001). Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.

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