David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):309 – 327 (2007)
Since we explain behavior by ascribing intentional states to the agent, many philosophers have assumed that some guiding principle of folk psychology like the following, which I call intentional states and actions (ISA), must be true: "If A and B are different actions, then the agents performing them must differ in their intentional states at the time they are performed." Recent results in the physiology of vision present a prima facie problem for this principle. These results show that some visual information that guides spatial manipulation and fine motor control is unavailable for verbal report. Plausibly, this information is not consciously available to the agent, and as such, not available to inform the content of intentional states. Thus, it is hard to see how every difference in action is subject to intentional explanation, as (ISA) requires. I articulate the prima facie problem and argue that the most plausible solution requires us to reject (ISA)
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References found in this work BETA
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Susan L. Hurley (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
Paul M. Fitts (1954). The Information Capacity of the Human Motor System in Controlling the Amplitude of Movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology 47 (6):381.
Citations of this work BETA
Thor Grünbaum (2011). Commonsense Psychology, Dual Visual Streams, and the Individuation of Action. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):25 - 47.
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