David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-26 (2013)
What’s really at issue in the debate between the transparency theorist and the qualia realist? To answer this question it will be useful to start off with Tye’s clear and, I think, representative ways of defining these views.What is qualia realism? Tye glosses the view as the claim that “Experiences have intrinsic features that are non-intentional and of which we can be directly aware via introspection.”Tye (2013, p. 4). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Tye’s work in what follows are to this paper. That is:Qualia Realism: There are features which:are features of experiences;are intrinsic properties of experiences;are non-intentional;are such that we can be directly aware of them via introspection.He also suggests that at least many qualia realists will hold that “the phenomenal character of an experience is one and the same as the cluster of such intrinsic features.” It will be useful have a label for this stronger view; I suggestStrongQualia Realism: There are fea
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References found in this work BETA
Tim Bayne (2009). Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Tye (2014). Speaks on Strong Property Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):85-86.
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