What are debates about qualia really about?

Philosophical Studies 170 (1):59-84 (2014)
What’s really at issue in the debate between the transparency theorist and the qualia realist? To answer this question it will be useful to start off with Tye’s clear and, I think, representative ways of defining these views.What is qualia realism? Tye glosses the view as the claim that “Experiences have intrinsic features that are non-intentional and of which we can be directly aware via introspection.”Tye. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Tye’s work in what follows are to this paper. That is:Qualia Realism: There are features which:are features of experiences;are intrinsic properties of experiences;are non-intentional;are such that we can be directly aware of them via introspection.He also suggests that at least many qualia realists will hold that “the phenomenal character of an experience is one and the same as the cluster of such intrinsic features.” It will be useful have a label for this stronger view; I suggestStrongQualia Realism: There are fea
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0176-9
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,209
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Susanna Siegel (2006). Which Properties Are Represented in Perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 481--503.
David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Speaks (2015). Is Phenomenal Character Out There in the World? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):465-482.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Torin Alter (2003). Qualia. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
Lieven Decock & Igor Douven (2013). Qualia Compression. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):129-150.
James H. Moor (1988). Testing Robots for Qualia. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer
Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
Jason Holt (1999). Blindsight in Debates About Qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):54-71.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.
David Lewis (1995). Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):140-44.
Earl Conee (1985). The Possibility of Absent Qualia. Philosophical Review 94 (July):345-66.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

124 ( #34,568 of 1,941,073 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #56,732 of 1,941,073 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.