David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 168 (2):273 - 294 (2009)
Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each game, they can terminate connections to others, and new connections are created. Cooperative agents do well because they manage to cluster with cooperators and avoid defectors. Computer simulations demonstrate that group formation and exclusion are powerful mechanisms to promote cooperation in dilemma situations. This explains why social dilemmas can often be solved if agents can choose with whom they interact.
|Keywords||Cooperation Dynamic network Graph Scale-free network Exclusion Public good Group formation|
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References found in this work BETA
J. McKenzie Alexander (2003). Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1289-1304.
J. McKenzie Alexander (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Robert Axelrod (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.
Christoph Hauert & György Szabó (2003). Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games in Different Geometries: Compulsory Versus Voluntary Interactions. Complexity 8 (4):31-38.
Thomas Hobbes (2012/2006). Leviathan. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jaroslav Peregrin (2014). Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution. Topoi 33 (2):531-545.
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