David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The paper displays the similarity between the theory of probabilistic causation developed by Glymour et al. since 1983 and mine developed since 1976: the core of both is that causal graphs are Bayesian nets. The similarity extends to the treatment of actions or interventions in the two theories. But there is also a crucial difference. Glymour et al. take causal dependencies as primitive and argue them to behave like Bayesian nets under wide circumstances. By contrast, I argue the behavior of Bayesian nets to be ultimately the defining characteristic of causal dependence.
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Citations of this work BETA
Max Kistler (2013). The Interventionist Account of Causation and Non-Causal Association Laws. Erkenntnis 78 (1):1-20.
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