Causation: An alternative

Abstract
The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this ‘status raising’ is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals with cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. It finally indicates how the account's profound epistemic relativization induced by ranking theory can be undone. Introduction Variables, propositions, time Induction first Causation Redundant causation Objectivization.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi151
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Franz Huber (2013). Structural Equations and Beyond. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.
F. Huber (2011). Lewis Causation is a Special Case of Spohn Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):207-210.

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