Isaac Levi's potentially surprising epistemological picture

In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press (2006)
This paper compares the epistemological conception of Isaac Levi with mine. We are joined in both giving a constructive answer to the relation of belief and probability, without reducing one to the other. However, our constructions differ in at least nine more or less important ways, all discussed in the paper. In particular, the paper explains the similarities and differences of Shackle's functions of potential surprise, as used by Levi, and my ranking functions in formal as well as in philosophical respects. The appendix explains how ranking and probability theory can be combined in the notion of a ranked probability measure (or probabilified ranking function)
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Hans Rott (2009). Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 301--339.

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