Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer (1988)
It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step of revision. The paper discusses and rejects two solutions within the confines of AGM theory. It then introduces ranking functions (as I prefer to call them now; in the paper they are still called ordinal conditional functions) as the proper (and, I find, still the best) solution of the problem, proves that conditional independence w.r.t. ranking functions satisfies the so-called graphoid axioms, and proposes general rules of belief change (in close analogy to Jeffrey's generalized probabilistic conditionalization) that encompass revision and contraction as conceived in AGM theory. Indeed, the parallel to probability theory is amazing. Probability theory can profit from ranking theory as well since it is also plagued by the problem of iterated belief revision even if probability measures are conceived as Popper measures (see No. 11). Finally, the theory is compared with predecessors which are numerous and impressive, but somehow failed to explain the all-important conditional ranks in the appropriate way.
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Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
Hans P. Van Ditmarsch (2005). Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
Franz Huber (2007). The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions. Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.
Holger Andreas (2011). A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
Hannes Leitgeb (2007). Beliefs in Conditionals Vs. Conditional Beliefs. Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
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