|Abstract||The paper argues that the objects of belief should not be conceived as sets of possible worlds or propositions of set of centered possible worlds or egocentric propositions (this is the propositional conception), but rather as sets of pairs consisting of a centered world and a sequence of objects (this is the intentional conception of the objects of belief). The paper explains the deep significance of this thesis for the framework of two-dimensional semantics, indeed for any framework trying to adequately relate semantics and epistemology (which is here construed as what I call the Congruence Principle). I give three arguments for this thesis, two preliminary indecisive ones by way of examples, and third theoretical one alluding to a deep principle of philosophical psychology (which I call the Invariance Principle). This paper is an improved and up-dated version of my paper No. 25. It will appear in Causation, Coherence, and Concepts. A Collection of Essays of mine.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Liliana Albertazzi (2007). At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.
Wolfgang Spohn (1996). On the Objects of Belief. In C. Stein & M. Textor (eds.), Intentional Phenomena in Context. Hamburg.
David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117 - 138.
Michael J. Pendlebury (1990). Sense Experiences and Their Contents: A Defense of the Propositional Account. Inquiry 33 (2):215-30.
Berit Brogaard (2010). Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception: Short Version. In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy).
Greg Restall (1997). Ways Things Can't Be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
Philip Robbins (2004). To Structure, or Not to Structure? Synthese 139 (1):55-80.
Added to index2010-07-24
Total downloads22 ( #62,658 of 722,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?