David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 98 (1):73-93 (1994)
Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general
|Keywords||Behavior Consciousness Epistemology Functionalism Physicalism Hannay, A|
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W. V. Quine (1953). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
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David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
Alastair Hannay (1971). Mental Images: A Defense. Allen & Unwin.
Citations of this work BETA
Fred Adams & Rebecca Garrison (2013). The Mark of the Cognitive. Minds and Machines 23 (3):339-352.
Fred Adams & Rebecca Garrison (2014). The Mark of the Cognitive: Reply to Elpidorou. Minds and Machines 24 (2):213-216.
Leemon McHenry (2010). Sprigge's Ontology of Consciousness. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):5-20.
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