Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation

Abstract
The ‘received view’ about computation is that all computations must involve representational content. Egan and Piccinini argue against the received view. In this paper, I focus on Egan’s arguments, claiming that they fall short of establishing that computations do not involve representational content. I provide positive arguments explaining why computation has to involve representational content, and how the representational content may be of any type (e.g. distal, broad, etc.). I also argue (contra Egan and Fodor) that there is no need for computational psychology to be individualistic. Finally, I draw out a number of consequences for computational individuation, proposing necessary conditions on computational identity and necessary and sufficient conditions on computational I/O equivalence of physical..
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.

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