Dreyfus and Spinosa on things-in-themselves
Inquiry 42 (1):115 – 124 (1999)
| Abstract | It is questioned whether Dreyfus and Spinosa's essay faces the real issue of things-inthemselves. The importance of distinguishing three interconnected problems deserving to come under Dreyfus and Spinosa's title, 'Coping with Things-in-themselves', is stressed. These are (1) What is the real nature of the world in the midst of which we, whatever we really are, exist?; (2) Can the properties of things (or even of types of things) be distinguished into two types, those which belong to them necessarily (with a de re necessity) and those which belong to them only contingently?; and (3) Which are the properties of things to which reference would have to be made in an ideally correct formulation of the laws which govern change as opposed to descriptions of their results in particular actual circumstances? | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesHubert L. Dreyfus & Charles Spinosa (1999). Coping with Things-in-Themselves: A Practice-Based Phenomenological Argument for Realism. Inquiry 42 (1):49-78.
Hubert L. Dreyfus & Charles Spinosa (1999). Coping with Things-in-Themselves: A Practice-Based Phenomenological Argument for Realism. Inquiry 42 (1):49 – 78.
Robert C. Solomon (1995). Marketing Heidegger: Entrepreneurship and Corporate Practices. Inquiry 38 (1 & 2):75 – 81.
Hubert L. Dreyus & Charles Spinosa (1997). Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology. Man and World 30 (2):159-178.
Charles Spinosa & Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). Robust Intelligibility: Response to Our Critics. Inquiry 42 (2):177-194.
Charles Spinosa & Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). Robust Intelligibility: Response to Our Critics. Inquiry 42 (2):177-194.
Charles Spinosa & Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). Robust Intelligibility: Response to Our Critics. Inquiry 42 (2):177 – 194.
Mark A. Wrathall (1999). Practical Incommensurability and the Phenomenological Basis of Robust Realism. Inquiry 42 (1):79 – 88.
Richard Rorty (1999). Not All That Strange: A Response to Dreyfus and Spinosa. Inquiry 42 (1):125 – 128.
Jeff Malpas (1999). The Fragility of Robust Realism: A Reply to Dreyfus and Spinosa. Inquiry 42 (1):89 – 101.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads9 ( #115,463 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
