Is Dennett a disillusioned zimbo?

Inquiry 36 (1-2):33-57 (1993)
D. C. Dennett propounds a ?multiple drafts? conception of consciousness which is both materialist and anti?realist (in something like Dummett's sense). Thus there is no determinate truth as to what the components of someone's consciousness were over any particular period and the order in which they occurred. In opposition to this an anti?materialist form of psychical realism is defended here. There really is a precise something which it is like to be a conscious individual at each moment. The main difficulty in accepting this view is that it seems to make it quite contingent what type of consciousness performs what function in the economy of the organism, e.g. that pleasure acts as a positive, pain as a negative, reinforcer of behaviour. There is a problem here which can only be avoided by abandoning the Humean doctrine that there cannot be necessary relations between distinct existences
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Epistemology  Mind  Realism  Science  Dennett, D
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DOI 10.1080/00201749308602310
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Thomas Nagel (1979). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.

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