David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):353-362 (2010)
This paper examines the justification for the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). HEC claims that human cognitive processes can, and often do, extend outside our heads to include objects in the environment. HEC has been justified by inference to the best explanation (IBE). Both advocates and critics of HEC claim that we should infer the truth value of HEC based on whether HEC makes a positive, or negative, explanatory contribution to cognitive science. I argue that IBE cannot play this epistemic role. A serious rival to HEC exists with a differing truth value, and this invalidates IBEs for both the truth and falsity of HEC. Explanatory value to cognitive science cannot be used as a guide to the truth value of HEC
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