David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):353-362 (2010)
This paper examines the justification for the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). HEC claims that human cognitive processes can, and often do, extend outside our heads to include objects in the environment. HEC has been justified by inference to the best explanation (IBE). Both advocates and critics of HEC claim that we should infer the truth value of HEC based on whether HEC makes a positive, or negative, explanatory contribution to cognitive science. I argue that IBE cannot play this epistemic role. A serious rival to HEC exists with a differing truth value, and this invalidates IBEs for both the truth and falsity of HEC. Explanatory value to cognitive science cannot be used as a guide to the truth value of HEC
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1975). The Meaning of 'Meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
Robert D. Rupert (2004). Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
Citations of this work BETA
John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Paul G. Keil & Amanda J. Barnier (2010). The Psychology of Memory, Extended Cognition, and Socially Distributed Remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):521-560.
Robert D. Rupert (2013). Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not About Cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):25-47.
Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger (2015). Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
Andy Clark (2011). Finding the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (3):447 - 461.
Mikkel Gerken (2014). Outsourced Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.
Similar books and articles
Mark Sprevak (2009). Extended Cognition and Functionalism. Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.
Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2011). Belief-Forming Processes, Extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
Michele Merritt (2011). The Cure for the Cure: Networking the Extended Mind. Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):463 - 485.
Mason Cash (2010). Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Deborah W. Splaingard (1994). The Use of Metaphors in Hospital Ethics Committees: A Field Study of a Children's HEC and a Veterans Administration HEC. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 6 (4):223-234.
Added to index2009-07-12
Total downloads97 ( #42,118 of 1,907,057 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #200,048 of 1,907,057 )
How can I increase my downloads?