Synthese 174 (3):331 - 340 (2010)
|Abstract||The application of probabilistic arguments to rational decisions in a single case is a contentious philosophical issue which arises in various contexts. Some authors (e.g. Horgan, Philos Pap 24:209–222, 1995; Levy, Synthese 158:139–151, 2007) affirm the normative force of probabilistic arguments in single cases while others (Baumann, Am Philos Q 42:71–79, 2005; Synthese 162:265–273, 2008) deny it. I demonstrate that both sides do not give convincing arguments for their case and propose a new account of the relationship between probabilistic reasoning and rational decisions. In particular, I elaborate a flaw in Baumann’s reductio of rational single-case decisions in a modified Monty Hall Problem.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Paul Weirich (2002). Decisions to Follow a Rule. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):280-281.
Henry E. Kyburg (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
Branden Fitelson (2007). Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation. Synthese 156 (3):473 - 489.
Ana Franco-Watkins, Peter Derks & Michael Dougherty (2003). Reasoning in the Monty Hall Problem: Examining Choice Behaviour and Probability Judgements. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):67 – 90.
Gary Fuller (2007). PVS and the Terri Schiavo Case. Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):299-303.
M. Albert (2007). The Propensity Theory: A Decision-Theoretic Restatement. Synthese 156 (3):587 - 603.
Luca Ferrero (forthcoming). Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor. Philosophers' Imprint.
Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26.
Ken Levy (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities. Synthese 158 (1):139 - 151.
Peter Baumann (2008). Single-Case Probabilities and the Case of Monty Hall: Levy's View. Synthese 162 (2):265 - 273.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #48,084 of 722,856 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,856 )
How can I increase my downloads?