David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296 (2010)
Despite well-established results in survey methodology, many experimental philosophers have not asked whether and in what way conclusions about folk intuitions follow from people’s responses to their surveys. Rather, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that intuitions can be simply read off from survey responses. Survey research, however, is fraught with difficulties. I review some of the relevant literature—particularly focusing on the conversational pragmatic aspects of survey research—and consider its application to common experimental philosophy surveys. I argue for two claims. First, that experimental philosophers’ survey methodology leaves the facts about folk intuitions massively underdetermined; and second, that what has been regarded as evidence for the instability of philosophical intuitions is, at least in some cases, better accounted for in terms of subjects’ reactions to subtle pragmatic cues contained in the surveys.
|Keywords||Experimental philosophy Methodology Pragmatics Intuitions Method bias|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
J. R. Kuntz & J. R. C. Kuntz (2011). Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):643-665.
Antti Kauppinen (2007). The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.
Max Deutsch (2010). Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
Joshua Knobe (2004). What is Experimental Philosophy? The Philosophers' Magazine 28:37-39.
Frank Hofmann (2010). Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
James Genone (2012). Theories of Reference and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):152-163.
S. Matthew Liao, Alex Weigmann, Joshua Alexander & Gerard Vong (2011). Putting the Trolley in Order: Experimental Philosophy and the Loop Case. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):661 - 671.
Renia Gasparatou (2010). Experimental Appeals to Intuition. Crítica 42 (124):31-50.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Kirk Ludwig (2010). Intuitions and Relativity. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445.
Added to index2009-10-26
Total downloads469 ( #195 of 1,008,367 )
Recent downloads (6 months)79 ( #318 of 1,008,367 )
How can I increase my downloads?