David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113 (2010)
Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in "Assertion" is not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege's Puzzle
|Keywords||Robert Stalnaker Intentionality Frege's Puzzle|
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References found in this work BETA
David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Rudolf Carnap (1947/1956). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
David J. Chalmers (2002). On Sense and Intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):135-82.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jens Christian Bjerring (2013). Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result. Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
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