"Assertion" and intentionality

Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87 - 113 (2010)
Abstract
Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in "Assertion" is not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege's Puzzle
Keywords Robert Stalnaker  Intentionality  Frege's Puzzle
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    References found in this work BETA
    David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    David J. Chalmers (2002). On Sense and Intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):135-82.

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