A dilemma for particularist virtue ethics

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):665-678 (2008)
Abstract
There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexify of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a fairly strong version of the unity of the virtues
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Dancy (1995). In Defense of Thick Concepts. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):263-279.
Philippa Foot (1983). Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma. Journal of Philosophy 80 (7):379-398.

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