Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics

Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322 (2004)
This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the apparatus is contrasted with that of David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, and David Lewis. It is argued that this difference reflects a contrast between internalist and externalist approaches to the problem of intentionality
Keywords Assertion  Dimension  Logic  Modal Logic  Semantics  Chalmers, D  Kaplan, D  Lewis, D
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019550.81145.34
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Laura Schroeter (2008). Why Be an Anti-Individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.
Wolfgang Schwarz (2014). Against Magnetism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.

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