David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):759 – 777 (2008)
One of the most significant developments in the area of emotion theory in recent years is the revival of the psychoevolutionary approach to classification. This essay appraises the prospects for such an approach. The first contention is that the supposed advantages of psychoevolutionary classification over functional classification in scientific psychological research is less than presumed , particularly with respect to the utility of the classification , which is the basis of the argument for the superiority of psychoevolutionary classification. The second and central contention is that classification in terms of mechanisms proposed by empirical psychology and neuroscience has better prospects than psychoevolutionary classification with respect to both the utility for psychological research and the ability to carve psychological systems at their joints , that is , to produce natural kind divisions that distinguish emotions from other psychological traits.
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Boyd (1991). Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):127-48.
Richard Boyd (1989). What Realism Implies and What It Does Not. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.
M. M. Bradley, P. J. Lang, R. Lane & L. Nadel (2000). Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
Louis C. Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.
Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
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