Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?
Synthese (forthcoming)
| Abstract | In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees of belief play a role in real agents’ reasoning processes. On the other hand, the philosophical literature on reasoning, which relies much less heavily on idealizing assumptions about reasoners than Bayesianism, is almost exclusively concerned with outright belief. One possible explanation for why no philosopher has yet developed an account of reasoning with degrees of belief is that reasoning with degrees of belief is not possible for humans. In this paper, I will consider three arguments for this claim. I will show why these arguments are flawed, and conclude that, at least as far as these arguments are concerned, it seems like there is no good reason why the topic of reasoning with degrees of belief has received so little attention. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Harman Probability Reasoning Degrees of Belief | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesFranz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.
Jane Friedman (forthcoming). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 4.
James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer.
Brad Armendt (2010). Stakes and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 147 (1).
Guy Politzer & Laure Carles (2001). Belief Revision and Uncertain Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 7 (3):217 – 234.
C. Piller (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75:175 - 216.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema 26 (1):131-137.
David Christensen (1996). Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2009). Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-10-27Total downloads26 ( #47,706 of 549,196 )Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #5,070 of 549,196 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
