Noûs 45 (3):443-471 (2011)
|Abstract||It is commonly accepted by Kant scholars that Kant held that all necessary truths are a priori, and all a priori knowledge is knowledge of necessary truths. Against the prevailing interpretation, I argue that Kant was agnostic as to whether necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I focus on three kinds of modality Kant implicitly distinguishes: formal possibility and necessity, empirical possibility and necessity, and noumenal possibility and necessity. Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience; empirical possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of empirical objects; noumenal possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of things in themselves. Because we cannot know the causal powers of things in themselves, we cannot know what is noumenally necessary and what is noumenally contingent. Consequently, we cannot know whether noumenal necessity is co-extensive with a priority. Therefore, for all we know, some a priori propositions are noumenally contingent, and some a posteriori propositions are noumenally necessary. Thus, contrary to the received interpretation, Kant distinguishes epistemological from metaphysical modality|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tuomas E. Tahko (2008). A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis. Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.
Robert Greenberg (1999). The Ontology of Kant's Theory of Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:39-48.
Gordon Prescott Barnes (2007). Necessity and Apriority. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495 - 523.
Robert Greenberg (2001). Kant's Theory of a Priori Knowledge. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Vasilis Politis (1997). The Apriority of the Starting-Point of Kant's Transcendental Epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):255 – 284.
Chen Bo (2011). Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.
M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2012). On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo. Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):147-164.
Martha I. Gibson (2011). A Revolution in Method, Kant's “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws. Kant-Studien 102 (1):1-21.
Nicholas Stang (2013). Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan. Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106.
Ash Gobar (1988). Erklärung and Begründung in Kantian Epistemology. Philosophy Research Archives 14:343-358.
Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). ‘Kant’s Proof of the Law of Inertia’. In H. Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress. Marquette University Press.
Stephen K. McLeod (2008). Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism. Philosophy 83 (2):179-191.
John Turri (2011). Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
G. H. R. Parkinson (1960). Necessary Propositions and "A Priori" Knowledge in Kant. Mind 69 (275):391-397.
Robert Hanna (1998). A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads92 ( #7,624 of 556,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,255 of 556,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?