David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Epistemology 21 (3):321 – 335 (2007)
This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, contrary to the implications of much of the existing discussion of group belief. I conclude by suggesting that applying social epistemological considerations to scientific collaborations could be practically beneficial, but only if an appropriately broad range of epistemic values is considered.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Bruno Latour & Steven Woolgar (1986). Laboratory Life; The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press.
David L. Hull (1988). Science as a Process an Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. University of Chicago Press.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
Christian List (2006). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics 116 (2):362-402.
Citations of this work BETA
Kristina Rolin (2015). Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration. Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Susann Wagenknecht (2015). Facing the Incompleteness of Epistemic Trust: Managing Dependence in Scientific Practice. Social Epistemology 29 (2):160-184.
Hanne Andersen (2010). Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case Study. Episteme 7 (3):248-265.
Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht (2013). Epistemic Dependence in Interdisciplinary Groups. Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
Similar books and articles
Chase B. Wrenn (2007). Why There Are No Epistemic Duties. Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.
Don Fallis (2007). Collective Epistemic Goals. Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.
Raul Hakli (2007). On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief. Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Andrew Reisner (2008). Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
Kent W. Staley (2010). Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs. Episteme 7 (3):232-247.
Marc Moffett (2007). Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry. Episteme 4 (3):352-367.
Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads124 ( #25,502 of 1,777,936 )
Recent downloads (6 months)37 ( #20,348 of 1,777,936 )
How can I increase my downloads?