Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan

Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106 (2013)
Abstract
In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument is valid but its conclusion trivial. On the other, it is unsound on Kant's own view
Keywords Kant  Noumenal Affection  Freedom
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    Desmond Hogan (2009). Noumenal Affection. Philosophical Review 118 (4):501 - 532.
    Patrick Frierson (2010). Two Standpoints and the Problem of Moral Anthropology. In James Krueger & Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Walter Degruyter. 83.
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