Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan

Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106 (2013)
In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument is valid but its conclusion trivial. On the other, it is unsound on Kant's own view
Keywords Kant  Noumenal Affection  Freedom
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415412000301
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Desmond Hogan (2009). Noumenal Affection. Philosophical Review 118 (4):501 - 532.
Nicholas Stang (2013). Adickes on Double Affection. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 787-798.
Patrick Frierson (2010). Two Standpoints and the Problem of Moral Anthropology. In James Krueger & Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Walter Degruyter 83.

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