David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433 (2007)
In Being and Time as well as in his later writings, Heidegger comes to distinguish between fundamental moods and everyday or inauthentic moods. He also claims that phenomenology, rather than psychology, is the appropriate method for examining moods. This article employs a schematic approach to investigate a phenomenology of fundamental moods in terms of its possibilities and limits. Since, in Being and Time, the distinction between fundamental moods and ordinary moods is tied to the division between authenticity and inauthenticity, the latter concepts need to be addressed first. Guided by Klaus Held's article 'Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture', the second part of the article argues that Heidegger's phenomenology of moods is indeed one-sided, favouring anxiety at the expense of awe. Finally, I argue that, contrary to Held's claims, this one-sidedness cannot be amended by the means one finds in Heidegger's analyses. Instead, it is necessary to undertake closer examination of those moods which necessarily involve the other person
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