Knowledge and Practical Interests

Oxford University Press (2005)
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Subjectivity  Semantics (Philosophy  Psycholinguistics
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Reprint years 2007
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Call number BD222.S73 2005
ISBN(s) 0199230439   0199288038   9780199288038     9780199230433
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x
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John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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