Knowledge and Practical Interests

Oxford University Press (2005)
Abstract
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Subjectivity  Semantics (Philosophy  Psycholinguistics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $4.00 used (95% off)   $16.94 new (44% off)   $28.15 direct from Amazon (7% off)    Amazon page
Call number BD222.S73 2005
ISBN(s) 0199230439   0199288038   9780199288038  
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

View all 130 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

77 ( #17,920 of 1,102,744 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #18,253 of 1,102,744 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.