David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2005)
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of Subjectivity Semantics (Philosophy Psycholinguistics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$4.86 used (94% off) $25.28 new (28% off) $34.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD222.S73 2005|
|ISBN(s)||0199230439 0199288038 9780199288038|
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Citations of this work BETA
Teresa Marques (2015). Retractions. Synthese:1-25.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Daniel Whiting (2016). Against Second‐Order Reasons. Noûs 49 (4).
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