Knowing how

Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444 (2001)
Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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DOI jphil200198819
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Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Jason Stanley (2011). Knowing (How). Noûs 45 (2):207 - 238.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.

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Can anyone point me towards criticisms of this paper?

I understand it was very well-received.  Is there a general consensus that knowledge-how is a variety of knowledge-that?

I tend to think of knowledge-that as a variety of knowledge-how.  I think that was Ryle's outlook, as per chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind, where he seems to regard knowledge-that as a particular set of abilities to do with language.  I thus wonder if Stanley and Williamson might have misrepresented Ryle's distinction.  Admittedly, this is just a first-blush response.  I have not yet analyzed their critique of Ryle's argument against the "intellectualist legend."

Any pointers here would be greatly appreciated.


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