David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444 (2001)
Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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University of Szczecin
Can anyone point me towards criticisms of this paper?
I understand it was very well-received. Is there a general consensus that knowledge-how is a variety of knowledge-that?
I tend to think of knowledge-that as a variety of knowledge-how. I think that was Ryle's outlook, as per chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind, where he seems to regard knowledge-that as a particular set of abilities to do with language. I thus wonder if Stanley and Williamson might have misrepresented Ryle's distinction. Admittedly, this is just a first-blush response. I have not yet analyzed their critique of Ryle's argument against the "intellectualist legend."
Any pointers here would be greatly appreciated.