Knowing how
Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444 (2001)
| Abstract | Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
David Bzdak (2008). On Amnesia and Knowing-How. Techné 12 (1):36-47.
Paul Noordhof (2003). Something Like Ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
Michael David Roth (1970). Knowing. New York,Random House.
Jason Stanley (2011). Know How. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Hetherington (2008). Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
Christopher Winch (2009). Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Vocational Education. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):88-101.
Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1).
Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Leslie Marsh (2010). Ryle and Oakeshott on the “Knowing-How/Knowing-That” Distinction. In Corey Abel (ed.), The Meanings of Michael Oakeshott's Conservatism.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads586 ( #63 of 549,196 )Recent downloads (6 months)58 ( #383 of 549,196 )How can I increase my downloads? |
| Start a new thread | There is 1 thread in this forum |
| 2009-09-02 | |
|
Jason Streitfeld
University of Szczecin |
Can anyone point me towards criticisms of this paper?
I understand it was very well-received. Is there a general consensus that knowledge-how is a variety of knowledge-that? I tend to think of knowledge-that as a variety of knowledge-how. I think that was Ryle's outlook, as per chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind, where he seems to regard knowledge-that as a particular set of abilities to do with language. I thus wonder if Stanley and Williamson might have misrepresented Ryle's distinction. Admittedly, this is just a first-blush response. I have not yet analyzed their critique of Ryle's argument against the "intellectualist legend." Any pointers here would be greatly appreciated. Regards, Jason
Latest replies:
|

