David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 75 (3):206-231 (2009)
This article is an extended analysis of the most recent scholarly work on Locke's account of sensitive knowledge. Lex Newman's "dual cognitive relations" model of sensitive knowledge is examined in detail. The author argues that the dual cognitive relations model needs to be revised on both philosophical and historical grounds. While no attempt is made to defend Locke's position, the aim is to show that it is at least consistent, contrary to the received view. The final section provides textual support for the interpretation.
|Keywords||sensitive knowledge Newman external world Locke|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Martijn Blaauw (2008). Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
Henry G. Leeuwevann (1981). Locke's Theory of Sensitive Knowledge. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (2).
I. C. Tipton (ed.) (1977). Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
Nicholas Jolley (1999). Locke: His Philosophical Thought. Oxford University Press.
Keith Allen (2013). Locke and Sensitive Knowledge. Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (2):249-266.
Benjamin Hill (2006). Reconciling Locke's Definition of Knowledge with Knowing Reality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):91-105.
Mark D. Mathewson (2006). John Locke and the Problems of Moral Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):509–526.
Lex Newman (2004). Locke on Sensitive Knowledge and the Veil of Perception – Four Misconceptions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):273–300.
Lex Newman (2007). Locke on Knowledge. In , The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Cambridge University Press.
Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Sensation and Skepticism. In Matthew Stuart (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Locke. Blackwell.
Added to index2009-08-27
Total downloads47 ( #28,781 of 1,008,473 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,266 of 1,008,473 )
How can I increase my downloads?