David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In John Hawthorne (ed.), Language and Mind. Blackwell 321--44 (2003)
If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is necessarily true, then what it says must be so. If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is possible, then what it says could be true. Following natural philosophical usage, it would thus seem clear that in assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is assessing what is said by that occurrence. In this paper, I argue that natural philosophical usage misleads here. In assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is not assessing the modal status of the proposition expressed by that occurrence of the sentence.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian Rabern (2013). Monsters in Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
Dilip Ninan (2010). Semantics and the Objects of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (5):355-380.
Brian Rabern (2012). Against the Identification of Assertoric Content with Compositional Value. Synthese 189 (1):75-96.
J. R. G. Williams (2008). The Price of Inscrutability. Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.
Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer (2006). Proper Names and Relational Modality. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.
Similar books and articles
George Boolos (1980). Omega-Consistency and the Diamond. Studia Logica 39 (2-3):237 - 243.
Haim Gaifman (1992). Pointers to Truth. Journal of Philosophy 89 (5):223-261.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads267 ( #10,463 of 1,902,527 )
Recent downloads (6 months)56 ( #6,804 of 1,902,527 )
How can I increase my downloads?