David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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David Mermin suggests that my recent proof pertaining to quan tum nonlocality is undermined by an essential ambiguity pertaining to the meaning of counterfactual statements in quantum physics The ambiguity he cites arise from his imposition of a certain criterion for the meaningfulness of such counterfactual statements That criterion con ates the meaning of a counterfactual statement with the details of a proof of its validity in such a way as to make the meaning of such a statement dependent upon the context in which it occurs That dependence violates the normal demand in logic that the meaning of a statement be de ned by the words in the statement itself not by the context in which the statement occurs My proof conforms to that normal requirement I describe the context independent meaning within my proof of the counterfactual statements in question..
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Citations of this work BETA
Tomasz Bigaj (2007). Counterfactuals and Non-Locality of Quantum Mechanics: The Bedford–Stapp Version of the GHZ Theorem. Foundations of Science 12 (1):85-108.
Abner Shimony (2006). An Analysis of Stapp's “A Bell-Type Theorem Without Hidden Variables”. Foundations of Physics 36 (1):61-72.
Tomasz Bigaj (2010). How to (Properly) Strengthen Bell's Theorem Using Counterfactuals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (1):58-66.
Tomasz Bigaj (2013). How to Evaluate Counterfactuals in the Quantum World. Synthese 190 (4):619-637.
Tomasz Bigaj (2010). How to Strengthen Bell's Theorem Using Counterfactuals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):58-66.
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