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On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369-382 (2003)
Abstract
Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.Author's Profile
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On 'the denial of bivalence is absurd'.F. J. Pelletier & R. J. Stainton - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369 – 382.
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Citations of this work
The Psychology of Vagueness: Borderline Cases and Contradictions.Sam Alxatib & Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):287-326.
Can one get bivalence from (tarskian) truth and falsity?Dan López de Sa - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
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