On Wed, 22 Oct 2003, Balaguer, Mark wrote: > Dear Henry,
| Abstract | > What I'm interested in is your response to Tegmark. I haven't yet looked at > the paper you sent me in your email, but one response that I thought of is > this: Tegmark's argument, if cogent, suggests that there can't be neural > indeterminacies based on macro-level superpositions that collapse due to > neural processes. But your view doesn't involve macro-level superpositions; > it involves micro-level superpositions (of presynaptic calcium ions). So > even if Tegmark's argument is sound, it's irrelevant to your view. Does > this sound right to you? | |||||||||
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Greg Restall (2003). Just What is Full-Blooded Platonism? Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):82--91.
Mark Balaguer (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
J. M. Dieterle (2000). Supervenience and Necessity: A Response to Balaguer. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):302-309.
Mark Colyvan & Edward N. Zalta (1999). Mathematics: Truth and Fiction? Review of Mark Balaguer's. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):336-349.
Mark Balaguer (2009). Why There Are No Good Arguments for Any Interesting Version of Determinism. Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21.
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