David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201 - 229 (2006)
According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral truths in both reaching and justifying our particular moral judgments without thereby violating the particularists' stricture against substantive moral principles. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent non-substantive accounts of moral generalities appealed to by radical particularists – the heuristic account and default reasons accounts – fail in this aim.
|Keywords||Jonathan Dancy default reasons heuristic principles Margaret Olivia Little moral epistemology moral particularism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sean D. McKeever & Michael Ridge (2006). Particularism and the Contingent a Priori. Acta Analytica 21 (2):3-11.
Shidan Lotfi (2009). Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and Moral Particularism. Theoria 75 (2):100-116.
Benedict Smith (2006). Particularism, Perception and Judgement. Acta Analytica 21 (2):12-29.
Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.) (2000). Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press.
Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Usable Moral Principles. In Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.
Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (2011). Defending Particularism From Supervenience/Resultance Attack. Acta Analytica 26 (4):387-402.
David Bakhurst (2005). Particularism and Moral Education. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):265 – 279.
Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge (2008). Preempting Principles: Recent Debates in Moral Particularism. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1177-1192.
Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge (2005). What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism? Ratio 18 (1):93–103.
Michael Ridge (2005). What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism? Ratio 18 (1):93-103.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads44 ( #31,410 of 1,018,151 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #28,367 of 1,018,151 )
How can I increase my downloads?