David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Husserl Studies 25 (3):219-233 (2009)
In this paper I sketch a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s fundamental concept of “attitude”. I first explore Husserl’s account with respect to the three faculties of intellect, will, and emotivity [Gemüt], which also define the three basic kinds of attitude. The attitude assumed by the subject plays at this level the important role of articulating and unifying, according to an overall direction, various underlying moments of a complex act. I then focus on the specific intellectual, viz. cognitive attitudes and highlight the difference between the naturalistic attitude (which characterizes the natural sciences) and the personalistic attitude (which characterizes the human sciences). I then consider the notion of the natural attitude and argue that the personalistic attitude represents the systematic core of it. The natural attitude may be defined as the human attitude, i.e., as the attitude in which subjects posit themselves exclusively as human subjects belonging to the world , which is itself unceasingly posited as being. In the final part of the paper I explore the function of the phenomenological reduction insofar as it opens up a possibility of self-understanding that breaks with the natural, human self-apprehension and discloses subjectivity in its transcendental dimension. This opens up a radically new attitude, the phenomenological, which should not be confused with a first-person perspective within the framework of the natural attitude.
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References found in this work BETA
Edmund Husserl (2009). Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie Und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Felix Meiner Verlag Gmbh.
Charles Siewert (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.
Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Edmund Husserl (2003). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Felix Meiner Verlag Gmbh.
Edmund Husserl (2009). Philosophie Als Strenge Wissenschaft. Felix Meiner Verlag Gmbh.
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