David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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John Searle begins his recent article “Dualism Revisited” by stating his belief that the philosophical problem of consciousness has a scientific solution. He then claims to refute dualism. It is therefore appropriate to examine his arguments against dualism from a scientific perspective
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