David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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: I propose an epistemological extension of the error-statistical (ES) account of inference advocated by Deborah Mayo. To supplement the unrelativized account of evidence provided by ES, I propose a relativized notion, which I designate security, meant to conceptualize practices aimed at the justification of inferences from evidence. I then show how the notion of security can be put to use by showing how two very different theoretical approaches to model criticism in statistics can both be viewed as strategies for securing (in my sense) claims about statistical evidence.
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