David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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It is widely believed by both scientists and philosophers that consciousness, as we experience it, was not always present in this universe, but emerged gradually from a more purely physical stratum in conjunction with the development of biological systems, and, in particular, nervous systems. But if one assumes that the physical foundation from which consciousness emerged is adequately described by classical physical theory then one is put in a quandry by the deterministic character of that theory. For the dynamical completeness of classical physical theory entails that either the emerging structure causes actual violations of the deterministic laws or that this emerging structure makes no actual difference to the course of physical events. The second option seems implausible, because then there could be no feed back that would allow survival considerations to lead to the gradual development and..
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