David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio Juris 22 (3):339-358 (2009)
Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in support of the orthodox view. Since my main purpose is to clear the ground for the alternative, I spell out the orthodox view in some detail. I then briefly sketch the alternative. Finally, I turn to Jules Coleman's discussion of the alternative.
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References found in this work BETA
Jules L. Coleman (2001). The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Darwall (2009). Authority and Second Personal Reasons for Acting. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Leslie Green (1985). Authority and Convention. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (141):329-346.
Mark Greenberg (2011). The Standard Picture and its Discontents. In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Nagel (2005). The Problem of Global Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):113–147.
Citations of this work BETA
Torben Spaak (2011). Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy. A Critical Appraisal. Ratio Juris 24 (2):156-193.
Miguel-Jose Lopez-Lorenzo (2012). The Planning Theory of Law. Res Publica 18 (2):201-206.
George Letsas (2014). The DNA of Conventions. Law and Philosophy 33 (5):535-571.
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