Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays

Oxford University Press (2003)
Robert Stalnaker draws together in this volume his seminal work in metaphysics. The central theme is the role of possible worlds in articulating our various metaphysical commitments. The book begins with reflections on the general idea of a possible world, and then uses the framework of possible worlds to formulate and clarify some questions about properties and individuals, reference, thought, and experience. The essays also reflect on the nature of metaphysics, and on the relation between questions about what there is and questions about how we talk and think about what there is. Two of the fourteen essays, plus an extensive introduction that sets the papers in context and draws out the essays' common threads, are published here for the first time.
Keywords Modality (Logic
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Call number BC199.M6.S73 2003
ISBN(s) 0199251495   0199251487   9780199251490   9780199251483
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Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2010). The Way Things Were. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.

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