Philosophen in der mikrowelt — ratlos?

Summary In this report on the present state of the discussion about the interpretation of quantum mechanics an attempt is made to provide an idea of the philosophical relevance of the foundations of physics. A simplified model of the measuring process is given which shows the difficulties in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is argued against Bohr's solution (also in a version of H. Putnam). Two examples show possible philosophical consequences of quantum mechanics: The variety of quantum logics challenges the foundations of logic, the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (with Bell's inequality) may be interpreted along the lines of holism. Against alleged refutations of realism by means of quantum mechanics, a realist standpoint is maintained. A proper interpretation of quantum mechanics from an epistemological point of view seems still to be lacking
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DOI 10.1007/BF01801117
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Hilary Putnam (1982). Three Kinds of Scientific Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):195-200.

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