Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Dialogue 50 (02):333-346 (2011)
Abstract
In a recent paper (2008), I presented two arguments against the thesis that intentional states are essentially normative. In this paper, I defend those arguments from two recent responses, one from Nick Zangwill in his (2010), and one from Daniel Laurier in the present volume, and offer improvements of my arguments in light of Laurier’s criticism.
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PhilPapers Archive Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Against Essential Mental Normativity Again
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References found in this work BETA
John Broome (2005). Does Rationality Give Us Reasons? Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
Allan Gibbard (2005). Truth and Correct Belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.

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Nick Zangwill (2005). The Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
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