Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Dialogue 50 (02):333-346 (2011)
In a recent paper (2008), I presented two arguments against the thesis that intentional states are essentially normative. In this paper, I defend those arguments from two recent responses, one from Nick Zangwill in his (2010), and one from Daniel Laurier in the present volume, and offer improvements of my arguments in light of Laurier’s criticism.
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217311000370
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PhilPapers Archive Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Against Essential Mental Normativity Again
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA
Teemu Toppinen (2015). Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.

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Similar books and articles
Nick Zangwill (2005). The Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.

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