David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Faith and Philosophy 6 (3):303-319 (1989)
A paradox is constructed employing four languages L1-L4, such that L1 is a metalanguage for L3, L3 for L2, and L2 for L1; L4 functions as the semantic meta-metalanguage for each of L1-L3. The paradox purports to show that no omniscient being can exist, given that there is a set of true sentences (each true within its respective language) from L1, L2, and L3 that no omniscient being can believe.The remainder of the paper consists in an examination of some attempts at challenging the paradox on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic grounds. Just which of these attempts are the most promising for the religious person is a question which is left open
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Elia Zardini, If Every True Proposition is Knowable, Then Every Believed (Decidable) Proposition is True, or the Incompleteness of the Intuitionistic Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.
Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.
Carlo Proietti & Gabriel Sandu (2010). Fitch's Paradox and Ceteris Paribus Modalities. Synthese 173 (1):75 - 87.
Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
Peter B. M. Vranas (2004). Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
Jay Newhard (2005). Grelling's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):1 - 27.
Daniel Immerman (2012). Parallels Between Gaps and Gluts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):383-394.
Richard Otte (1985). Probabilistic Causality and Simpson's Paradox. Philosophy of Science 52 (1):110-125.
Roger Clarke (2010). “The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer. Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
Deborah K. Heikes (2004). The Bias Paradox: Why It's Not Just for Feminists Anymore. Synthese 138 (3):315 - 335.
Erik J. Wielenberg (2001). The New Paradox of the Stone Revisited. Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):261-268.
P. Eldridge-Smith (2011). Pinocchio Against the Dialetheists. Analysis 71 (2):306-308.
Richard Kenneth Atkins (2011). This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421-444.
Jeff Snapper (2012). The Liar Paradox in New Clothes. Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads5 ( #237,418 of 1,101,802 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #306,516 of 1,101,802 )
How can I increase my downloads?