David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (4):321-330 (2000)
This paper is a response to Christopher Boorse's recent defense of hisBiostatistical Theory (BST) of health and disease. Boorse maintains that hisconcept of theoretical health and disease reflects the ``consideredusage of pathologists.'' I argue that pathologists do not use ``disease'' inthe purely theoretical way that is required by the BST. Pathology does notdraw a sharp distinction between theoretical and practical aspects ofmedicine. Pathology does not even need a theoretical concept of disease. Itsfocus is not theoretical, but practical; pathology's goal is to contribute tothe healing of patients. Pathology, even experimental pathology, is notvalue-free. Not only ``disease'' but also such terms as ``nerve'' and ``organ''are laden with conceptual values.
|Keywords||disease health pathology philosophy of medicine values|
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Citations of this work BETA
Christopher Boorse (2014). A Second Rebuttal On Health. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):683-724.
Richard P. Hamilton (2010). The Concept of Health: Beyond Normativism and Naturalism. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):323-329.
Marco Antonio Azevedo (2015). Health as a Clinic-Epidemiological Concept. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):365-373.
J. David Guerrero (2010). On a Naturalist Theory of Health: A Critique. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (3):272-278.
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