Philosophy of Science 63 (4):666-674 (1996)
|Abstract||In a recent essay (1995), Andrew Wayne charges that Bayesian attempts to account for the rule that, ceteris paribus, diverse evidence confirms better than narrow evidence are inadequate. I reply to these criticisms and argue that, on the contrary, one of the Bayesian approaches considered by Wayne does an excellent job of explaining why, and under what circumstances, diverse evidence is valuable|
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