Belief control and intentionality

Synthese 188 (2):145-163 (2012)
In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.
Keywords Belief  Compatibilism  Deciding to believe  Doxastic attitudes  Doxastic voluntarism  Intentionality  Libertarianism  Volitions  Voluntary control
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9919-3
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (2014). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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Andrei A. Buckareff (2004). Acceptance and Deciding to Believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
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Mark Alicke & David Rose (2010). Culpable Control or Moral Concepts? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):330-331.
Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Intentionality. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press 139-143.

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