David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 156 (1):53 - 77 (2007)
The likelihood principle (LP) is a core issue in disagreements between Bayesian and frequentist statistical theories. Yet statements of the LP are often ambiguous, while arguments for why a Bayesian must accept it rely upon unexamined implicit premises. I distinguish two propositions associated with the LP, which I label LP1 and LP2. I maintain that there is a compelling Bayesian argument for LP1, based upon strict conditionalization, standard Bayesian decision theory, and a proposition I call the practical relevance principle. In contrast, I argue that there is no similarly compelling argument for or against LP2. I suggest that these conclusions lead to a restrictedly pluralistic view of Bayesian confirmation measures.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Language Metaphysics Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
James Joyce (1999). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori (2014). State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
Vincenzo Crupi (forthcoming). Inductive Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-10.
J. Brian Pitts (2013). Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism. Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
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