Bayesian confirmation theory and the likelihood principle

Synthese 156 (1):53 - 77 (2007)
The likelihood principle (LP) is a core issue in disagreements between Bayesian and frequentist statistical theories. Yet statements of the LP are often ambiguous, while arguments for why a Bayesian must accept it rely upon unexamined implicit premises. I distinguish two propositions associated with the LP, which I label LP1 and LP2. I maintain that there is a compelling Bayesian argument for LP1, based upon strict conditionalization, standard Bayesian decision theory, and a proposition I call the practical relevance principle. In contrast, I argue that there is no similarly compelling argument for or against LP2. I suggest that these conclusions lead to a restrictedly pluralistic view of Bayesian confirmation measures.
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Christensen (1999). Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
    A. W. F. Edwards (1972). Likelihood. Cambridge [Eng.]University Press.

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