Bayesian confirmation theory and the likelihood principle

Synthese 156 (1):53 - 77 (2007)
The likelihood principle (LP) is a core issue in disagreements between Bayesian and frequentist statistical theories. Yet statements of the LP are often ambiguous, while arguments for why a Bayesian must accept it rely upon unexamined implicit premises. I distinguish two propositions associated with the LP, which I label LP1 and LP2. I maintain that there is a compelling Bayesian argument for LP1, based upon strict conditionalization, standard Bayesian decision theory, and a proposition I call the practical relevance principle. In contrast, I argue that there is no similarly compelling argument for or against LP2. I suggest that these conclusions lead to a restrictedly pluralistic view of Bayesian confirmation measures.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/27653506
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Vincenzo Crupi (forthcoming). Inductive Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-10.

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