David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S153- (2001)
Critics of Bayesianism often assert that scientists are not Bayesians. The widespread use of Bayesian statistics in the field of radiocarbon calibration is discussed in relation to this charge. This case study illustrates the willingness of scientists to use Bayesian statistics when the approach offers some advantage, while continuing to use orthodox methods in other contexts. The case of radiocarbon calibration, therefore, suggests a picture of statistical practice in science as eclectic and pragmatic rather than rigidly adhering to any one theoretical position
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Roger Stanev (2015). Early Stopping of RCTs: Two Potential Issues for Error Statistics. Synthese 192 (4):1089-1116.
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