David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 65 (4):537-559 (2011)
In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. In response to this strategy, I distinguish between two types of intentionality and argue that belief is no less intentional than action is
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Richard A. Fumerton (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Robert Booth (2014). On Some Recent Moves in Defence of Doxastic Compatibilism. Synthese 191 (8):1867-1880.
Margaret Schmitt (2015). Freedom and Reason. Synthese 192 (1):25-41.
Nicholas Tebben (2014). Deontology and Doxastic Control. Synthese 191 (12):2835-2847.
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