Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253 (2010)
| Abstract | We introduce an operator to represent the simple notion of being wrong. Read Wp to mean: the agent is wrong about p . Being wrong about p means believing p though p is false. We add this operator to the language of propositional logic and study it. We introduce a canonical model for logics of being wrong, show completeness for the minimal logic of being wrong and various other systems. En route we examine the expressiveness of the language. In conclusion, we discuss an open question regarding K4 | |||||||||
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