Utilitas 24 (01):118-125 (2012)
|Abstract||It is widely held that the possibility of value-incomparability between alternatives poses a serious threat to comparativism. Some comparativists have proposed to avoid this problem by supplementing the three traditional value relations with a fourth value relation, variously identified as "roughly equal" or "on a par", which is supposed to hold between alternatives that are incomparable by the three traditional value relations. However, in a recent article in this journal, Nien-he Hsieh has proposed that the comparisons thought to require rough equality or parity could instead be understood in terms of the concept of "clumpiness". Against this suggestion, Martin Peterson has argued that the concept of clumpiness allows agents to be exploited in money-pumps, and thus that there is no way of linking clumpiness to rational choice. This would remove the central appeal of the concept. In this note, I show that Peterson’s argument fails to establish that the concept of clumpiness allows agents to be exploited in money-pumps.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Martin Peterson (2007). Parity, Clumpiness and Rational Choice. Utilitas 19 (4):505-513.
Nien-hê Hsieh (2005). Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability. Utilitas 17 (2):180-204.
Martijn Boot (2009). Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justified Choice. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
Martin Peterson & Barbro Fröding (2012). Virtuous Choice and Parity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):71-82.
Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.
Mark Leon (2011). Reason and Coercion: In Defence of a Rational Control Account of Freedom. Philosophia 39 (4):733-740.
Isaac Levi (2012). Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (5):1-17.
Bairj Donabedian (2003). The Natural Realm of Social Law. Sociological Theory 21 (2):175-190.
Edward F. McClennen (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge University Press.
Bruno Verbeek (2010). Rational Choice Virtues. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):541-559.
Stanley Kelley (1995). The Promise and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory. Critical Review 9 (1-2):95-106.
Ruth Chang (2005). Parity, Interval Value, and Choice. Ethics 115 (2):331-350.
Michael Almeida (2006). The Unreal Problem of No Best World. Philo 9 (2):103-112.
Added to index2011-08-26
Total downloads21 ( #58,789 of 549,628 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,790 of 549,628 )
How can I increase my downloads?